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"We are never as steeped in history as when we pretend not to
be, but if we stop pretending we may gain in understanding
what we lose in false innocence."

Michel-Rolph Trouillot'
INTRODUCTION

We continue to pay a heavy price for our history in slavery. 2 It is no
exaggeration to say that the legacies of slavery determined the

* Copyright @ 2018 Juan F. Perea. Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago
School of Law. Many thanks to Dean Jennifer Rosato Perea, and to Gregory Mark,
Daniel Morales, Allison Tirres, Judge Warren Wolfson, and Maggie Livingston and the
DePaul University School of Law Faculty Workshop for helpful comments and
critique. And thanks to the editors and staff of the UC Davis Law Review, in particular
Ms. Andreanne Breton, for their very thoughtful and careful editing of this article.
This is the second in a series of articles exploring the current effects of slavery on
our law. The first in the series is The Echoes of Slavery: Recognizing the Racist Origins of
the Agricultural and Domestic Worker Exclusion from the National Labor Relations Act,
72 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (2010).
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outcome of the most recent presidential election. Donald Trump lost
the popular vote by 2.8 million votes. 3 As a matter of democracy, and
according to the will of the voters, he lost the election. Yet as a matter
of constitutional law and state electoral-vote allocations, Trump
received a substantial majority of the votes in the electoral college and
won the presidency. In addition, millions of otherwise eligible voters
were denied the right to vote through calculated voter suppression
efforts and felon disenfranchisement. 4 For a few days after the
election, there was a brief flicker of interest in the electoral college and
its origins in slavery. Now, several months since the election, this
interest has waned and there is little reckoning with the reason why
we have such undemocratic elections.
Donald Trump won the presidency because of two artifacts of
slavery: the electoral college and our post-Reconstruction legacy of
state voter suppression and disenfranchisement efforts. The electoral
college was created in the Constitution to protect the interests of slave
owners.5 And current voter suppression efforts are a direct legacy of
white efforts to prevent blacks from voting after the Fifteenth
6
Amendment prohibited race discrimination in voting.
Our failure to know and appreciate the depth of the legacies of
slavery leaves us entirely unprepared to understand why presidential
elections come out the way they do. In addition, the lack of historical
perspective leads us to accept that certain aspects of elections, like
state control over voting qualifications and felon disenfranchisement,
are somehow neutral and benign doctrines. State voter-suppression
efforts enjoy a surface plausibility they do not deserve.

2 These political costs of slavery protection, though substantial, come nowhere
near to reflecting the continuing emotional and economic costs to African Americans
of slavery and continuing white resistance to acknowledging the effects of slavery and
racism.
3 Judd Legum, Donald Trump Lost the Popular Vote by 2.8 Million. Most
Republicans Are Convinced He Won, THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 18, 2016, 1:47 PM),
https://thinkprogress.org/donald-trump-lost-the-popular-vote-by-2-8-million-mostrepublicans-are-convinced-he-won-bd8d3cOaObO.

4 See infra Section II.B.
5 See Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins of the Electoral College, 23 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1145, 1155 (2002); Akhil Amar, The Troubling Reason the Electoral College
Exists, TIME (Nov. 10, 2016, 2:19 PM), http://time.com/4558510/electoral-collegehistory-slavery.
6 See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE UNCONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 111-12 (2000); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF
SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY

SOUTH, 1880-1910, at 1-6 (1974).
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This Essay describes some of the principal legacies of slavery in our
electoral law and their major effects on the most recent presidential
election. First, I discuss why the Constitution itself is properly
considered a proslavery document. One of the proslavery features of
the Constitution is the electoral college, enacted as a way to protect
the interests of slave owners. Next, I discuss two aspects of state
control over voter qualifications that had a major restrictive impact on
the electorate: ostensibly neutral efforts like voter ID laws and felon
disenfranchisement laws.
I.

THE PROSLAVERY CONSTITUTION AND ELECTORAL POLITICS

The United States Constitution was a proslavery document. When I
write proslavery, I mean that the Constitution both protected slavery
and provided incentives to increase slavery. The proof of its proslavery
essence is straightforward. The apportionment clause provides that
each state shall have representatives in the House according to the
number of free persons and "three fifths of all other persons" that
inhabit the state.7 "Three fifths of all other persons" is a euphemism
for slaves. Under this provision, the number of congressional
representatives from slave states was increased by the number of
persons enslaved. This constitutional arrangement provided extra
political representation to protect slavery in the slave states. In
addition, the slave import limitation of Article I, Section 9, prohibited
Congress from regulating the slave trade until 1808, a twenty-one-year
window for additional slave importation.8 Under these two provisions,
slave owners and their elected representatives had a political incentive
to increase their number of slaves: more representation in Congress
corresponding to more slaves. And the slave import limitation
guaranteed their ability to import more slaves for twenty-one years.
Therefore, the original, proslavery Constitution provided incentives to
own more slaves and protection for the ability to import more slaves.
The Constitution provided additional protections for slave owners.
The Fugitive Slave Clause guaranteed the right of slave owners to

7 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States ... according to their respective Numbers,
which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including
those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three
fifths of all other Persons.").
8 Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight .... ).
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recapture their escaped slaves anywhere in the United States.9 Article
V of the Constitution forbade amending the Constitution to allow
Congress to inhibit the slave trade before 1808,10 one of only three
subjects protected from the amendment process in the whole
document.11 Article IV also guarantees federal protection for states
against "domestic violence," a phrase understood at the time to mean
slave rebellions.1 2
In addition to the Constitution's text, we have the words of the
Framers themselves. During the constitutional convention, Madison
recognized that slavery was the major political fault line between the
states:
But [Madison] contended that the States were divided into
different interests not by their difference of size, but by other
circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly from
climate, but principally from (the effects of) their having or
not having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the
great division of interests in the U. States. It did not lie
between the large & small States: it lay between the Northern
& Southern, and if any defensive power were necessary, it
ought to be mutually given to these two interests. He was so
strongly impressed with this important truth that he had been
casting about in his mind for some expedient that would
answer the purpose.13
Madison also defended the proslavery provisions of the Constitution
in the Federalist Papers. In Federalist No. 54, regarding the
apportionment clause, Madison wrote:
9 Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under
the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered
up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.").
10 See id. art. V.
11 See id. art. V.
12 Id. art. IV, § 4; see ROBERT G. PARKINSON, THE COMMON CAUSE: CREATING RACE
AND NATION IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 253, 527 (2016); THE FEDERALIST No. 43

(James Madison) ("I take no notice of an unhappy species of population abounding in
some of the States, who, during the calm of regular government, are sunk below the
level of men; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil violence, may emerge into
the human character, and give a superiority of strength to any party with which they
may associate themselves.").
13 James Madison, Proceedings of Convention, June 19-July 13, in 1 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 322, 486 (Max Farrand ed., 1911); see also THE
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

UNITED STATES 194-95 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1920).

Echoes of Slavery II

2018]

1085

The Federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great
propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in the
mixt character of persons and of property..

.

. Let the

compromising expedient of the Constitution be mutually
adopted, which regards them as inhabitants, but as debased by
servitude below the equal level of free inhabitants, which
regards the slave as divested of two fifth of the man.14
Madison later defended these slavery protections during the Virginia
state ratification convention. On June 17, 1788, responding to George
Mason's critique of the Constitution, Madison discusses the slave
import limitation and the Fugitive Slave Clause:
I should conceive ...

[the slave import limitation] to be

impolitic, if it were one of those things which could be
excluded without encountering greater evils. The Southern
States would not have entered into the Union of America
without the temporary permission of. . . [the slave] trade; and

if they were excluded from the Union, the consequences might
be dreadful to them and to us .

. .

. Another clause secures us

that property which we now possess. At present, if any slave
elopes to any of those states where slaves are free, he becomes
emancipated by their laws; for the laws of the states are
uncharitable to one another in this respect. But in this
Constitution, "no person held to service or labor in one state,
under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in
consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged
from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim
of the party to whom such service or labor shall be due." This
clause was expressly inserted, to enable owners of slaves to
reclaim them. This is a better security than any that now
exists. No power is given to the general government to
interpose with respect to the property in slaves now held by
the states .

. .

. Great as the evil is, a dismemberment of the

Union would be worse. If those states should disunite from the
other states for not indulging them in the temporary
continuance of this traffic, they might solicit and obtain aid
from foreign powers.' 5

14 THE

FEDERALIST

No.

54

Qames Madison),

reprinted in

THE AMERICAN

CONSTITUTION FOR AND AGAINST: THE FEDERALIST AND ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 240-41

0.R.

Pole ed., 1987).

15 James Madison, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 17, 1788),
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During ratification debates in South Carolina on January 17, 1788,
General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, also a participant in the
drafting of the Constitution, expressed his satisfaction with the
Constitution's protections for slaveholders:
By this settlement we have secured an unlimited importation
of negroes for twenty years. Nor is it declared that the
importation shall be then stopped; it may be continued. We
have a security that the general government can never
emancipate them, for no such authority is granted; and it is
admitted, on all hands, that the general government has no
powers but what are expressly granted by the Constitution,
and that all rights not expressed were reserved by the several
states. We have obtained a right to recover our slaves in
whatever part of America they may take refuge, which is a
right we had not before. In short, considering all
circumstances, we have made the best terms for the security of
this species of property it was in our power to make. We
would have made better if we could; but, on the whole, I do
not think them bad.16
Pinckney's comments are important because he was one of the most
ardent defenders of slavery at the convention. Had the Constitution
not protected slavery, the greatest form of wealth in the south, he
would never have defended its propriety for South Carolina and other
slave states.
While this exposition is necessarily brief, the evidence demonstrates
that the Constitution was a proslavery document. In addition, the
majority position among modern historians is that the Constitution
was proslavery.1 7 As written by historian George Van Cleve, the
reprintedin 3
FEDERAL

THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT

PHILADELPHIA 453-54 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836).
16 Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Speech at the South Carolina Ratifying
Convention (Jan. 17, 1788), as reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY
THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA 286 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836).
17 For contemporary scholarship interpreting the Constitution as proslavery, see
RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
333-36 (2009); PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE
AGE OF JEFFERSON ix (2d ed. 2001); GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS'
UNION: SLAVERY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 270
(2010); DAVID WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY'S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO

RATIFICATION 161-68 (2009); James Oakes, "The Compromising Expedient": Justifying a
Proslavery Constitution, 17 CARDOzo L. REV. 2023, 2023-27 (1996); cf. DON E.
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Constitution "was pro-slavery in its politics, its economics, and its
law."' 8 Unfortunately, and notwithstanding the clear evidence and the

consensus among historians, the nature and consequences of the
proslavery Constitution remain relatively unknown and understudied.19
11.

LEGACIES OF SLAVERY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Slavery Protection and the Electoral College

A.

By now everyone knows the paradoxical, undemocratic result of the
2016 election for president. Despite winning the popular vote by 2.8
million votes, Hillary Clinton lost the election to Donald Trump.
Trump won a substantial victory in the electoral college, which was
dispositive. 20 In the wake of Clinton's electoral college defeat, many
wondered why we have an electoral college at all. Why does the
world's leading democracy rely on an electoral institution that
overrides the results of democracy?
The answer to this question can be found in the proslavery
provisions of the Constitution. As described earlier, the "three-fifths of
all other persons" phrase in the apportionment clause was intended to
give additional representation in Congress to the slave states. The
electoral college also was created to protect the political interests of
slave owners in presidential elections.
FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY 39 (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001) [hereinafter
FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC] ("[The] view of the Constitution as

has gained wide acceptance in modem historical
culpably proslavery . ..
scholarship."); Matthew Mason, Book Note, 42 J. INTERDISc. HIST. 309, 309 (2011)
(reviewing VAN CLEVE, supra) ("Van Cleve, along with the majority of current
scholars, thus places slavery at the heart of the Founding of the United States, in no
instance more so than the Constitution . . . ."). Some historians continue to argue that

the Constitution was essentially neutral on slavery. See

DON

E.

FEHRENBACHER, THE

that slavery was peripheral to the
Constitution); FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC, supra, at 47 ("[T]he
Constitution as it came from the hands of the framers dealt only minimally and
peripherally with slavery and was essentially open-ended on the subject.").
DRED SCOTT CASE

18 VAN CLEVE,

26-27 (1978)

(arguing

supra note 17, at 270.

19 The question of why only a few of my readers know that the Constitution was
proslavery, raises interesting questions of epistemology and the ideology of
Constitutional Law casebooks. See Juan F. Perea, Race and Constitutional Law
Casebooks: Recognizing the Proslavery Constitution, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1125
(2012).
20 While many Clinton supporters hoped for "rogue electors" who would reject
their assigned votes for Trump, this very slim possibility never materialized.
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The problem the Framers tried to solve with the electoral college
was this: the Northern states had many more qualified, free white male
voters than the slave South, since slaves could not vote.21 This meant
that the antislavery North would outvote the South consistently in
elections for Congress and the President. The North's greater political
power under representative democracy posed an unacceptable threat
to slavery. In order to solve this problem, the Framers adopted the
"three-fifths" compromise, which increased the number of
representatives from the slave states by a number corresponding to
three-fifths the number of slaves held. This compromise equalized
roughly, at the time of the convention, the political power of the
North and South.
In order to solve this problem in presidential elections, the delegates
to the constitutional convention created the electoral college. The
need to protect the interests of slave owners was a primary objection
to having presidential elections directly by the people. On July 19,
1787, James Madison described both the intuitive appeal of direct
democracy and the superseding need for slavery protection through an
electoral college:
The people at large was in his opinion the fittest in itself. It
would be as likely as any that could be devised to produce an
Executive Magistrate of distinguished Character .

. .

. There

was one difficulty however of a serious nature attending an
immediate choice by the people. The right of suffrage was
much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern states;
and the latter could have no influence in the election on the
score of the Negroes. The substitution of electors obviated this
difficulty and seemed on the whole liable to the fewest
objections.22
As Madison describes, the problem with direct democracy was that the
free voting population in the North was much larger than that of the
South, since slaves could not vote. The southern slave states would
never agree to a system in which they could be consistently outvoted
by northerners, many of whom opposed slavery. The solution was to
bolster southern representation in the electoral college as in legislative
apportionment.

See Finkelman, supra note 5, at 1155.
James Madison, Session of Thursday, July 19, 1787, in THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION
21

22

STATES, supra note 13, at 282, 285-86.

DEBATES IN THE
OF THE UNITED

2018]
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Votes in the electoral college were allocated to states using the same
formula as legislative apportionment. 23 Each state's electoral votes
incorporated representation based on three-fifths of the number of
slaves, therefore boosting the electoral representation of slave states.24
The only reason we have an electoral college rather than a more direct
popular election was the need of slave owners to have additional
representation based on their slave ownership. Without this "slave
bonus," Southern slave states, with fewer free white voters, would
have been outvoted every time, as Madison recognized.25
Unlike any other democracy in the world, the United States has
presidential elections distorted in the bizarre manner of the electoral
college. 26 The magnitude of the distortion of democracy becomes
apparent when we consider the consequences of the electoral college.
In two out of the last five elections, in 2000 and 2016, the winner of
the popular vote lost the election in the electoral college. 27 The
electoral college thus repudiated the results of democracy fully forty
percent of the time over the last five elections. Other than a military
coup, there is no greater distortion possible than reliance on a system
that repudiates the results of democracy.
The electoral college system only makes sense when one considers
its original purpose in protecting the interests of slave owners. If the
electoral college had any rationality beyond the protection of slave
owners' property interests, then it would have been reproduced as a
reasonable manner of election somewhere. This is particularly true
since the United States has long been considered a leading democracy
in the world, modelling democracy for other countries.
Yet there is not a single instance of any other democratic
government choosing to reproduce the electoral college. Every other
form of election in this democracy, for governors, congressmen,
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
24 See id. (stating that the number of electors is "equal to the whole number of
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress"
thereby incorporating by reference the "three-fifths" clause, used to calculate the
number of representatives of a state in Congress).
25

Cf. GARRY WILLS, "NEGRO PRESIDENT": JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER 75-76

(2005) (discussing how the "slave bonus" helped Thomas Jefferson become president
in 1800).
26 Finkelman, supra note 5, at 1146 ("The system seems to be unique in the
United States - applying only to the presidential election - and unique to the United
States. I know of no western or industrialized democracy that uses such a system.").
27 Bill Chappell, Shades of 2000? Clinton Surpasses Trump in Popular Vote Tally,
NPR (Nov. 9, 2016, 7:22 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/11/09/
50139350 1/shades-of-2000-clinton-surpasses-trump-in-popular-vote-tally.
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senators, state representatives, mayors, and other local elections, relies
on a democratic process, not the electoral college.28 If the electoral
college was a reasonable manner of election, or even a rational manner
of election, then it would be imitated somewhere. The fact that the
electoral college does not exist or function anywhere besides
presidential elections in the United States is powerful evidence of just
how bizarre it is in a nation now free of slavery.
The electoral college results in myriad other distortions of
democracy. Because every state is guaranteed at least three electoral
votes regardless of size, small states have disproportionally more
representation, and therefore more electoral power, then the larger
states. 29 For example, sparsely populated Wyoming has the minimum
of three electoral votes, each electoral vote corresponding to 177,556
Wyoming citizens. 30 Densely populated California, in contrast, has
fifty-five electoral votes, each corresponding to 668,303 California
citizens.31 Wyoming electoral votes have 3.18 times more than the
electoral power of the national average, while California electoral votes
have only eighty-five percent of the power of the national average. 32 In
the last election this meant that voters in populous California had less
electoral clout than voters in sparsely populated Wyoming, a
nonsensical result. In addition, most states allocate their electoral
votes by winner-take-all, rather than by a proportional process,
making many votes appear meaningless. 33 Because of our electoral
system, candidates concentrate their attention only on a few swing
states and essentially ignore the rest of the country.
We live with a bizarre, undemocratic electoral system because we
fail to recognize the proslavery origins of the electoral college and we
have not amended the Constitution to provide a more rational
alternative. Yet there is little or no chance of achieving sufficient
consensus to abolish the electoral college, since the party winning the
presidency always benefits from the operation of the college.

28 Finkelman, supra note 5, at 1146; see, e.g., Amar, supra note 5 (explaining that
no governorship is decided using an electoral college method).
29 Finkelman, supra note 5, at 1145.
30 See Population vs. Electoral Votes, FAIRVOTE (last visited Sept. 27, 2017),
http://www.fairvote.org/population vs-electoral votes (follow "2008 Population vs.
Electors, State-by-State information" hyperlink).
31 See id.
32 Id.

33 Devin McCarthy, How the Electoral College Became Winner-Take-All, FAIRVOTE
(Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.fairvote.org/how-the-electoral-college-became-winnertake-all.

2018]1
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Instead of struggling in vain for an amendment, the best option for
reform today is the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact.3 4 States
who join the Compact commit to award their electoral votes to the
winner of the popular vote.35 When the total number of electoral votes
committed by states joining the Compact reaches 270 or more, the
winning total is awarded to the candidate who wins the popular vote. 36
The Compact guarantees that the winner of the popular vote also wins
the electoral college and becomes president. To date, eleven states
totaling 165 electoral votes have joined the Compact.3 7
State-Centered Voter QualificationStandards and Voter Suppression

B.

One of the important aspects of federalism today is our statecentered system of voter qualifications in national elections. Prior to
the adoption of the Constitution, each colony was able to set its own
voter qualifications. 38 In general, suffrage was limited to propertyowning white males. 39 The original Constitution was silent on the
right to vote, except to specify that state legislatures would determine
the "manner" of selection of electors for the presidency. 40 Accordingly,
under the Constitution states retained their original colonial powers to
determine the qualifications of voters. While subsequent amendments
forbade state discrimination with regard to race, sex, age, and poll
taxes,4 1 states remained free to decide for themselves all other
qualifications for voters.4 2 This is why different states are able to
define different periods for early voting, require different sorts of voter
IDs, and use differing standards for felon disenfranchisement.43
Voter qualification standards, however, have been used throughout
our history as a way to deny African Americans the right to vote. After
34 Mark Joseph Stem, Yes, We Could Effectively Abolish the Electoral College Soon. But
We Probably Won't., SLATE (Nov. 10, 2016, 2:14 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the
slatest/2016/11/10/theelectoralcollege-could beabolishedwithoutanamendment.
html.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.; Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote,
NAT'L POPULAR VOTE, http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation (last
visited Sept. 12, 2017).
38 KEYSSAR, supra note 6, at 18.
39 Id. at 8, 56.
40 Id. at 4.
41 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
42 KEYSSAR, supra note 6, at 4.
3

See id.
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the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited overt race discrimination in
voting, southern slave owners and their supporters engaged in a
prolonged, violent campaign to suppress voting by the newly freed
slaves.44 Violent suppression of the vote was supplemented by laws
designed and enforced to eliminate black voting.45 White-controlled
state legislatures enacted ostensibly race-neutral, yet racially targeted
voting qualifications and rules to disqualify African Americans, and, in
the Southwest, Mexican Americans. These racially suppressive laws
included grandfather clauses, poll taxes, felon disenfranchisement,
secret ballots, literacy tests and white primaries. 46 Responding to the
continuing intimidation and suppression of African American voters,
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965.47 Considering the long
history of voter suppression laws targeted at people of color, it is
remarkable that laws restricting voting continue to have any
plausibility.
Our history warrants suspicion and careful scrutiny of such laws.
Instead, the Supreme Court has legitimized and encouraged voter
suppression in its recent voting rights decisions. In Crawfordv. Marion
County Election Board,48 the Court decided that Indiana's voter
identification law was constitutional, notwithstanding its potential
effect in suppressing voters.49 Only Justice Souter, dissenting,
recognized that the law was pretextual and intended to benefit

*4 See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. Moss, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A
HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS
253-55 (7th ed. 1994); NICHOLAS LEMANN,
REDEMPTION: THE LAST BATTLE OF THE COLD WAR XI (2007) (describing vigilantism in

the South to suppress African American rights); JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN,
LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 44-45 (2006).

45 MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 44, at 44-45.
46 Id. Though initially upheld, the Supreme Court eventually struck down such
voting restrictions, mostly during the second half of the twentieth century. See, e.g.,
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966) (stating Congress has power to
regulate and invalidate certain literacy requirements); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (declaring poll taxes unconstitutional); Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953) (striking down white primaries); Guinn v. United
States, 238 U.S. 347, 367-68 (1915) (striking down grandfather clauses).
47 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2018).
48 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
49 Indiana's law required all voters casting a ballot in person to present valid,
government-issued photo identification. The state justified the measure as a way to
prevent voter fraud. The Court found insufficient evidence of the exact number of
voters potentially disenfranchised by the photo ID requirement. According to the lead
opinion, on the basis of the record that had been made in this litigation, the Court
could not "conclude that the statute imposes excessively burdensome requirements on
any class of voters." Id. at 202.
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Republicans. 50 Ironically, Judge Richard Posner, who authored the
appeals court decision upheld in Crawford, later admitted that he had
made a mistake and acknowledged that voter ID laws are "a type of
law now widely regarded as a means of voter suppression rather than
of fraud prevention." 5
In Shelby County v. Holder, the Court invalidated the preclearance
provisions of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA") because, according to the
Court, the VRA violated the equal dignity of states. 52 Under the VRA
prior to Shelby, covered jurisdictions, mostly in the Deep South, had
to seek preclearance from the Justice Department before executing
laws that adversely affected voter participation. 53
Newly freed from the preclearance requirement, several states
promptly enacted new, restrictive voting requirements.54 The same day
as the Court's ruling, Texas officials vowed to enforce a strict photo ID
requirement.5 5

Alabama

and

Mississippi

followed

suit. 56

North

Carolina enacted one of the nation's most restrictive laws, reducing
the availability of voter registration and early voting.5 7
See id. at 224-25 (Souter, J., dissenting).
RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 85 (2013); John Schwartz, Judge in
Landmark Case Disavows Support for Voter ID, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/16/us/politics/judge-in-landmark-case-disavowssupport-for-voter-id.html?mcubz=1. In a subsequent dissent, Posner wrote, "There is
only one motivation for imposing burdens on voting that are ostensibly designed to
discourage voter-impersonation fraud, if there is no actual danger of such fraud, and
that is to discourage voting by persons likely to vote against the party responsible for
imposing the burdens." Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 796 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner,
J., dissenting).
52 See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623-24 (2013). According to a
recent report, the decision in Shelby County has had three major effects: Section 5 no
longer blocks or deters discriminatory voting changes, as it did for decades and right up
until the Court's decision; challenging discriminatory laws and practices is now more
difficult, expensive, and time-consuming; and the public now lacks critical information
about new voting laws that Section 5 once mandated be disclosed prior to
implementation. TOMAS LOPEZ, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, SHELBY COUNTY: ONE YEAR
LATER 1 (2014), http/www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/ShelbyCountyOneYearLater.pdf.
53 See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2619-20.
5
See Michael Cooper, After Ruling, States Rush to Enact Voting Laws, N.Y. TIMES
(July 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/06/us/politics/after-Supreme-Court(discussing moves made by
ruling-states-rush-to-enact-voting-laws.html?mcubz=1
state officials of former VRA-affected states to pass new voter ID laws).
50
51

55
56

Id.
Id.

Ari Berman, North Carolina Passes the Country's Worst Voter Suppression Law,
(July 26, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/north-carolina-passescountrys-worst-voter-suppression-law.
57
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Ostensibly Neutral Voter Suppression

These voter suppression laws are another legacy of slavery that
affected the 2016 election. Republican-controlled legislatures in many
states enacted laws that made voting more difficult for persons of color
and other presumptively Democratic voters. Since 2010, twenty states
enacted restrictive new laws.58 In fourteen states, more restrictive laws
became newly effective during the 2016 election. 59 Wisconsin's voter
ID law, for example, suppressed 200,000 votes.60 The suppression
targeted African-American and likely Democratic voters, whose voter
turnout was disproportionately reduced. 61 Since Donald Trump won
Wisconsin by a bare 22,748 votes, one-tenth of the number of
suppressed votes, voter suppression probably determined the outcome
in that swing state. 62
Republicans have attempted to justify these laws by claiming that
they are intended to reduce voter fraud and to boost voter confidence
in elections.63 This explanation is pretextual, since there is virtually no
in-person voter fraud in United States elections. 64 Evidence
demonstrates that the actual intent of these laws was exactly what they
accomplished: the suppression of African-American and other likely
Democratic voters. As one writer noted, "[t]he passage of voter ID
laws is 'highly partisan, strategic, and racialized."'65 And as noted by
the federal judge who initially overturned Wisconsin's voter
restrictions, "The evidence-. . . casts doubt on the notion that voter ID
laws foster integrity and confidence. The Wisconsin experience
demonstrates that a preoccupation with mostly phantom election
fraud leads to real incidents of disenfranchisement, which undermine

58 Vanessa Williamson, Voter Suppression, Not Fraud, Looms Large in U.S. Elections,
BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/11/08/

voter-suppression-in-u-s-elections.
59 Id.
SAri Berman, Wisconsin's Voter-ID Law Suppressed 200,000 Votes in 2016 (Trump
Won by 22,748), NATION (May 9, 2017), https//www.thenation.com/article/wisconsinsvoter-id-law-suppressed-200000-votes-trump-won-by-23000. It is important to note that
the statistics cited in this source were collected by an agency with ties to the Democratic
Party and have not been peer-reviewed, but they are corroborated by data collected by
the Government Accountability Office. Id.
61
62

Id.
See id.

63 See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 235 (4th
Cir. 2016).
64 Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting).
65 Williamson, supra note 58.
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rather than enhance confidence in elections, particularly in minority
communities." 66

According to one writer, North Carolina was "the epicenter of voter
suppression efforts during the 2016 campaign." 67 Prior to the Shelby
County decision, North Carolina was a covered jurisdiction under the
VRA, required to submit legislation affecting voting rights to the
Justice Department for preclearance. 68 Days after Shelby County
eliminated the preclearance requirement, the Republican-controlled
legislature considered new, extensive voting restrictions.69 The
legislators requested information on voter behavior by race, and
decided to restrict practices that were used most frequently by black
voters.70 Hoping to reduce black voter participation, which had
reached historic highs, the legislature voted to require specific voter
IDs known to be less available to African Americans, and to reduce
early voting, same-day registration, out-of-precinct voting, and
preregistration.71 In July 2016, these extensive voting restrictions were
declared unconstitutional because they targeted black voters. 72
Because black voters were targeted "with almost surgical precision," 73
the court concluded that "because of race, the legislature enacted one
of the largest restrictions of the franchise in modern North Carolina
history."74
Contrary to the appellate court's negative appraisal, North Carolina
Republicans boasted about the effectiveness of their voter restrictions
in suppressing the black vote. According to a Republican press release,
"fewer black voters cast early ballots this year than they did in 2012.
'African American Early Voting is down 8.5 percent from this time in
2012."'"5 This decline in black voting was the cumulative result of
Republican voter suppression efforts. 76
66 One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 903 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
67 Max J. Rosenthal, North Carolina GOP Brags About How Few Black People Were
Able to Vote Early, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 7, 2016, 7:17 PM), http://www.motherjones.

com/politics/2016/ 1/north-carolina-gop-brags-about-how-few-black-people-were-ablevote-early.
68 McCrory, 831 F.3d at 215.

See id. at 216.
See id. at 216-18.
71 Id.
72 See id. at 214-15.
73 Id. at 214.
69
70

74 Id. at 242.
75 Rosenthal, supra note 67.
76 Id. ("The decline in early voting among black voters is likely a result of
yearslong efforts by North Carolina's Republican officials and political operatives to
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Wisconsin and North Carolina are just two of the states that sought
to curb voting by African Americans and other likely Democratic
voters. Taking the history of attempts to eliminate black voting into
account, we can understand that even ostensibly neutral laws like
voter ID requirements are merely present-day attempts to suppress
black voters and democrats. The Supreme Court's decisions finding
such requirements constitutional deny history and condone these
attempts to curb black voting. If the Court took the history of racially
discriminatory voter suppression seriously, it would be impossible to
condone these restrictions by accepting pretextual state interests in
eliminating non-existent fraud or bolstering the credibility of
elections.
2.

Felon Disenfranchisement

Alone among major world democracies, the United States allows
millions of criminal convicts to be barred from voting.77 Felon
disenfranchisement played a large role in the 2016 presidential
election. Over six million otherwise eligible voters were unable to vote
because of felony convictions.78 In Florida, for example, fully twentyone percent of the African American voting population was
disenfranchised because of a felony conviction.79 There is little doubt
that Hillary Clinton would have won Florida outright if felons had not
been disenfranchised.8 0 The very close outcomes in important swing
states also might have been different but for felon disenfranchisement:
in Michigan, the number of disenfranchised felons, 44,221, far
exceeded Trump's margin of victory, 10,704; in Wisconsin, the
number of felons disenfranchised, 65,606, was much larger than
Trump's margin of victory, 22,748; and in Pennsylvania, the number
of disenfranchised felons, 52,974, was larger than Trump's margin of
impose voting restrictions in the state. Emails obtained last week by Reuters showed
that Republican officials pushed successfully to restrict early voting sites and cut down
on early voting on Sundays, when many black churches hold 'Souls to the Polls' mass
voting drives.").
77 ERIN KELLEY, BRENNAN CTR. FORJUSTICE, RACISM & FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT:
HISTORY 1 & 4 n.1 (2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/publications/DisenfranchisementHistory.pdf; MANZA & UGGEN, supra
note 44, at 41.
AN INTERTWINED

78 CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
LEVEL

ESTIMATES

OF

FELONY

DISENFRANCHISEMENT,

6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATE2016,
at
3 (2016),

http//www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/6-Million-Lost-Voters.pdf.
79 Id.
so This assumes that felons would have voted in roughly the same proportions as
their voting-eligible counterparts.
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victory, 44,292.81 According to one estimate, 68.9% of disenfranchised
felons would have a preference for democrats. 82 Depending on
turnout, felon disenfranchisement probably made a significant
difference in the 2016 election.
As with other restrictions on voting, felon disenfranchisement came
into wide use to suppress the votes of newly enfranchised African
American voters after Reconstruction.8 3 Even though the Thirteenth
Amendment formally abolished slavery, the Amendment contains an
exception allowing involuntary servitude "as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."8 4 Recalcitrant
Southern former slave owners were determined to re-establish white
rule and to deny their recent ex-slaves the right to vote by all means
necessary, including violence.8 5
race
prohibited
direct
the Fifteenth Amendment
Since
discrimination in voting, southern whites acted by proxy, shaping
criminal law in such a way that disenfranchised newly freed blacks. 86
First, "black codes" were enacted that "criminalize[ed] black life."8 7
This included criminalizing activities that whites thought blacks were
more apt to engage in.8 8 Thus, southern states disenfranchised any
person found to be "a landless laborer, a vagrant, or a farmer who

81 UGGEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 15 (depicting the data for felon disenfranchisement);
Presidential Election Results 2016, CNN, http//edition.cnn.com/election/results/president
(last visited Sept. 27, 2017) (depicting data of Trump's margin of victory over Clinton).
82 See MANZA & UGGEN, supranote 44, at 190-92.
83 See id. at 43.
84 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
85 See DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF
BLACK PEOPLE IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II, at 53 (2008) ("The

attitudes among southern whites that a resubjugation of African Americans was an
acceptable - even essential - element of solving the 'Negro question' couldn't have
been more explicit."); see MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 44, at 56-57.
86 See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 299 (1985) ("[Tlhe Alabama
Constitutional Convention of 1901 was part of a movement that swept the postReconstruction South to disenfranchise blacks.").
87 BLACKMON, supra note 85, at 53 ("[Elvery southern state enacted an array of
interlocking laws essentially intended to criminalize black life . . . . Few laws
specifically enunciated their applicability only to blacks, but it was widely understood
that these provisions would rarely if ever be enforced on whites."); see PIPPA
HOLLOWAY,

LIVING IN INFAMY:

FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT

AND

THE HISTORY OF

AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 52 (2014) ("In this critical period when black southerners
gained U.S. citizenship and secured their voting rights, white southern political
leaders pushed back, hoping to deny this population both citizenship and political
power. . . .").
88 MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 44, at 43.
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allowed his animals to graze on common lands."89 States also
disenfranchised blacks who were jobless, who used "insulting gestures
or language," or who "preach[ed] the Gospel without a license." 90
Second, white legislators reclassified former misdemeanors, such as
petty theft and other minor offenses, as felonies, keeping former slaves
imprisoned longer and simultaneously disenfranchising them. 91 One
historian commented on the "region-wide pattern of expanded
punishment for petty theft that was identified at the time as intended
to disfranchise African Americans." 92
These techniques yielded double benefits to former slave owners, as
they perceived it. First, their imprisoned former slaves could be leased
out profitably to plantation owners, thus guaranteeing a captive work
force to labor in the fields and toil in the mines. 93 Second, their former
slaves would be disenfranchised as felons, practically guaranteeing
that they could never have voting power again.9 4
The evidence shows that the intention of these disenfranchisement
laws was to eliminate black voting and bolster white supremacy. In
1896, the Mississippi Supreme Court approved of the state's felon
disenfranchisement scheme, which punished nonviolent offenses
committed by blacks, but preserved the voting rights of whites
convicted of violent crimes like rape and murder:
The convention swept the circle of expedients to obstruct the
exercise of the franchise by the negro race. By reason of its
previous condition of servitude and dependence, this race had
acquired or accentuated certain peculiarities of habit, of
temperament and of character, which clearly distinguished it,
as a race, from that of the whites - a patient docile people,
but careless, landless, and migratory within narrow limits,
without forethought, and its criminal members given rather to
furtive offenses than to the robust crimes of the whites.
Restrained by the federal constitution from discriminating
against the negro race, the convention discriminated against its

89

ELIZABETH A. HULL, THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF Ex-FELONs 20 (2006).

90

Id.; see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,

1863-1877, at 253-61, 323-24 (1988).
91 HOLLOWAY, supra note 87, at 56.
92 HOLLOWAY, supra note 87, at 57.
93 See, e.g., BLACKMON, supra note 85, at 54-57.
94 See id.
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characteristics and the offenses to which its weaker members
were prone. 95
During its constitutional convention in 1901, Alabama added to the
offenses yielding disenfranchisement. The convention began
disenfranchising felons for "crimes of moral turpitude," including
vagrancy and living in adultery, crimes assumed to be more commonly
committed by blacks.96
In Hunter v. Underwood, the Supreme Court struck down Alabama's
felony disenfranchisement provision because it was intended to be
racially discriminatory:
The delegates to the all-white convention were not secretive
about their purpose. John B. Knox, president of the
convention, stated in his opening address: "And what is it that
we want to do? Why it is within the limits imposed by the
Federal Constitution, to establish white supremacy in this
State. "97

Although the Court responded appropriately to the evidence of
outright racial discrimination in Hunter v. Underwood, as a general
proposition the Court has approved of a wide array of ostensibly
neutral reasons
that states
may use as
reasons
for
disenfranchisement.98 This means that where there is little or no direct
evidence of racial discrimination, it will likely be difficult to challenge
felon disenfranchisement laws. Indeed, Alabama recently re-enacted
disenfranchisement for felonies involving "moral turpitude," this time

95

Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 868 (Miss. 1896); MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 44,

at 42.
96

MANZA

&

UGGEN,

226 (1985).
97 Hunter, 471

supra note 44, at 58; see Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222,

U.S.

at

229

(quoting

1

OFFICIAL

PROCEEDINGS

OF

THE

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA, MAY 21ST, 1901 TO SEPTEMBER
3RD, 1901, at 8 (1940)).

98 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53 (1974) ("Although the Court has
never given plenary consideration to the precise question of whether a State may
constitutionally exclude some or all convicted felons from the franchise, we have
indicated approval of such exclusions on a number of occasions. In two cases decided
toward the end of the last century, the Court approved exclusions of bigamists and
polygamists from the franchise under territorial laws of Utah and Idaho. Much more
recently we have strongly suggested in dicta that exclusion of convicted felons from
the franchise violates no constitutional provision. In Lassiter v. Northampton County
Board of Elections . . . the Court said, 'Residence requirements, age, previous criminal
record are obvious examples indicating factors which a State may take into
consideration in determining the qualifications of voters."' (citations omitted)).
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avoiding overt discussions of race while accomplishing exactly the
same discriminatory result.99
While felon disenfranchisement may seem intuitively reasonable, it
becomes much less so when one examines some of the actual felonies
that result in disenfranchisement. Felonies include the serious crimes
that immediately come to mind, like violent crimes. Violent crimes,
however, constituted only nineteen percent of felony convictions in
state courts in 2002.100 Drug trafficking and drug possession together
constituted thirty-one percent of felony convictions. 0 1 In certain
states, some remarkably minor crimes are classified as felonies, rather
than misdemeanors, also leading to disenfranchisement. In Maryland,
for example, "relatively innocuous [offenses] such as passing bad
checks, using fake IDs, and possessing fireworks without a license"
can result in disenfranchisement.102 In Alabama, a conviction for
vagrancy will result in the loss of voting rights.10 3
Felon disenfranchisement, which expanded after Reconstruction to
eliminate black voting, today operates in much the same way. Six
million otherwise eligible voters were denied the vote in the 2016
presidential election because they were deemed felons.104 Given the

disparate enforcement of criminal law against communities of color
and the expansion of crimes deemed felonies, it is no surprise that
felon disenfranchisement has a disproportionate disqualifying effect
on communities of color. The racially discriminatory character of
felon disenfranchisement laws is also made evident by the examples of
Vermont and Maine. Neither of these states disenfranchises felons.105
Indeed, felons in these states can even vote from their prison cells. 106
The population of both states is overwhelmingly white, over ninety
9 See Kira Lerner, Alabama Governor Signs Law Giving Thousands of Felons Their
Right to Vote Back, THINKPROGRESS (May 24, 2017, 5:29 PM), https://thinkprogress.
org/alabama-voting-restoration-86d82cc1c2d0. More recently, the governor signed
legislation clarifying the definition of "moral turpitude" which restored voting rights to
some felons. "Definition of Moral Turpitude Act" (HB 282), ACLU ALABAMA,
https://www.aclualabama.org/en/legislation/definition-moral-turpitude-act-hb-282
(last
visited Jan. 26, 2018).
100 MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 44, at 70.
101 Id.
102 HULL, supra note 89, at 5.
103 Id.
104 UGGEN ET AL., supra note 78; Annie Gurvis, Six Million Americans Are Not
Allowed to Vote, URB. INST. (Oct. 3. 2016), http://www.urban.org/2016-analysis/sixmillion-americans-are-not-allowed-vote.
105 Vann
R. Newkirk II, Polls for Prisons, ATLANTIC (Mar. 9, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/inmates-voting-primary/473016.
106 HULL, supra note 89, at 6.
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percent white.10 7 Felon disenfranchisement in those states would
disqualify white people, which may explain why they eschew
disenfranchisement altogether. In a democracy we should be highly
suspicious of laws whose current functioning excludes people of color
nearly as effectively as their more overtly racist forebears intended.
CONCLUSION: WHY THIS HISTORY MATTERS Now

Protections for slavery and for white supremacy determined the
outcome of the most recent election. Hillary Clinton lost the election
only because we cling to the bizarre electoral college, created simply to
bolster the political power of slave owners. And the continued
acceptance of state voter suppression laws, including felon
disenfranchisement, artificially disqualified millions of otherwise
eligible voters, and discouraged many thousands of others from any
participation.
So why does it make a difference to know the proslavery and white
supremacist origins of the electoral college and voter suppression
efforts? First, we can understand that we have a bizarre electoral
process because of the Framers' desire to protect slave owners in their
slave ownership. These are the real, evidence-based origins of the
electoral college. If the reason for the college was unclear before, now
it makes sense. We can understand that the world we inhabit
continues to be shaped in important ways by slavery and its aftermath.
The continuing legacies of slavery need to be explored further to
improve our understanding of our society. This clarity of
understanding is important for its own sake.
But this is not just an idle venture into history - this history is
dismayingly relevant, since the legacies of slavery continue to have
grave consequences for our society. Few things are more important in
a democracy than the election of a President and the consequences of
that election, such as the appointments of Supreme Court justices and
decisions to make or avoid war. We must recognize the proslavery
origins of our electoral politics to understand why change is necessary.
Once we understand this, then we can begin imagining different ways
of doing things that get us beyond the legacies of slavery. Clarity of
understanding leads to clarity of diagnosis. Clarity of diagnosis enables
meaningful strategies for change.
107 Newkirk, supra note 105; PopulationDistributionby Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAM.
(2016), https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/distribution-by-raceethnicity/
?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:
%22asc%22%7D.
FOUND.
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So what can be done once we have understanding? The problem
posed is an interesting one. To what extent should rules adopted to
protect slavery and slave owners, and later to prevent newly freed
slaves from political participation, continue to affect our national
elections? Many of us would answer "not at all." Yet when we consider
possible responses to this history, there are interesting political
dynamics that come into play that make change difficult.
First, consider the electoral college. We should amend the
Constitution to eliminate the electoral college. Interestingly, though,
there appears to be little sustained interest in that possibility. 108 Even
if interest were sustained, it is hard to imagine reaching sufficient
national consensus to achieve an amendment. Whichever party wins
the election will have benefitted from the college and will therefore be
loath to change it. This happened in the most recent election, with
Republicans singing retroactively the praises of the electoral college.
The most plausible alternative today is the National Popular Vote
Interstate Compact, which, if adopted by enough states, would award
the winning margin of 270 electoral votes to the winner of the popular
vote. 109 Alternatively, more states could choose to award their electoral
votes proportionately, rather than winner-take-all. To date, only two
states, Nebraska and Maine, have chosen to award their electoral votes
proportionately.'110

Another avenue for reform is to reduce state discretion in defining
voter qualifications. At present, states can define their own voter
qualifications as long as they comply with constitutional amendments
abolishing race, sex, and age discrimination. Notwithstanding the
Shelby County decision, much of the Voting Rights Act remains
constitutional as an enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment, which

108 Attention to the college disappeared quickly, just as it did when Al Gore won
the popular vote but lost the election in the electoral college. See Mario Trujillo, After
Bush v. Gore, Obama, Clinton Wanted Electoral College Scrapped, HILL (Oct. 27, 2012,

-

10:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/264347-obama-clinton-backedreforms-to-electoral-college-after-bush-v-gore ("The outcome triggered an intense
if shortlived - debate over reforming the Electoral College.").
109 Stern, supra note 34 ("The NPVIC is a proposed agreement among the states
and the District of Columbia to render the Electoral College obsolete by ensuring that
the winner of the popular vote also wins a majority of electoral votes .

. .

. If a state

passes the NPVIC, it vows to assign its electors to whichever candidate wins the
national popular vote - but only once enough states have joined the NPVIC to
guarantee that candidate 270 electoral votes.").
110 See Maine & Nebraska, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/maine_nebraska (last
visited Sept. 24, 2017).
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prohibits race discrimination in voting.111 Recognizing the proslavery
and racist origins of much state law defining voter qualifications, there
is a strong basis for further regulation under the Fifteenth
Amendment.
Lastly, there could be an important role for judicial review in
dealing with these vestiges of slavery. Given the demonstrable history
of racism with regard to state voter-qualifications law, the courts
should be extremely skeptical of any voter qualifications that reduce
access to voting. A democracy should protect, encourage, and facilitate
voting, rather than facilitate the denial of access to voting.
Unfortunately, recent Supreme Court decisions like Crawford and
Shelby County offer little hope that the current Court has any interest
in protecting minority voting rights.
So we come full circle. I began with the proposition that "we are
never as steeped in history as when we pretend not to be." 112 We

pretend that our Constitution is sound, and that the electoral college
and mostly unregulated, state-created voter qualifications are natural
features of our legal environment. But now we can know this is false:
large electoral consequences result from our history of slavery. These
vestiges of slavery cost us - black, white, Latino, other people of
color, and people of good will - dearly.

III See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) ("Our decision in no
way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting found in
§ 2. We issue no holding on § 5 itself, only on the coverage formula.").
112 TROUILLOT, supra note 1, at xxiii.

